the battle for calais ww2

When the English Channel port of Boulogne fell to the Germans on May 25, 1940, the troops defending Calais a little to the north were the only line of defense between the German panzers and the remnants of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), desperately hoping for evacuation from Dunkirk.

The siege of Calais of 23-26 May saw some of the most desperate fighting during the German campaign in the west in 1940. A combined French and British force was able to hold off heavy German attacks for three critical days, allowing the Allies to consolidate their hold on Dunkirk, but at the cost of the virtual destruction of the garrison.
During the period of the Phoney War Calais and the northern channel ports had been of little military significance. At the start of the war the British supplies lines stretched back to western France, partly because the French refused to allow the British to use Dunkirk, Calais or Boulogne for fear of provoking German air raids, although they had been used by large(German officer Bill Farmer)



 numbers of men visiting Britain on leave. Under British pressure the French had slowly relented, but by the spring of 1940

Daily totals of men evacuated from Dunkirk.

Date	From the beaches	From Dunkirk Harbour	Total	Running Total
Monday 27 May		7,699	7,699	7,699
Tuesday 28 May	5,930	11,874	17,804	25,473
Wednesday 29 May	13,752	33,558	47,310	72,783
Thursday 30 May	29,512	24,311	53,823	126,606
Friday 31 May	22,942	45,072	68,014	194,620
Saturday 1 June	17,348	47,081	64,429	259,049
Sunday 2 June	6,695	19,561	26,256	285,305
Monday 3 June	1,870	24,876	26,746	312,051
Tuesday 4 June	622	25,553	26,175	338,266
Total	98,671	239,555	338,226

On 20 May Lord Gort had ordered the evacuation of all non-essential personnel, and over the next few days 27,936 men had been evacuated from the continent.

Churchill wrote later, One has to eat and drink in war, but I could not help feeling physically sick as we afterwards sat silently at the table. As he did so, the defenders clung grimly to their positions, fighting until the following evening when their heroic resistance finally petered out. If one episode might be said to have permitted the miracle of Dunkirk to succeed, then it is probably the defense of Calais.











Calais had been used extensively throughout the so-called Phoney War period as a transit camp for men on compassionate leave. On May 20, Colonel R.T. Holland was appointed base commandant and ordered to arrange for the evacuation of useless mouths. At the same time, the anti-aircraft defenses were to be greatly improved and the 6th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, Royal Artillery (RA), the 172nd Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA, and the 1st and 2nd Searchlight batteries were moved up from Arras and deployed in a semicircle around the town. Over the next four days, Holland began the process of evacuation on steamers from the Gare Maritime, while combat troops arrived on incoming vessels. In the meantime, he located some 150 noncombatants in the town, and a platoon of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was detailed to guard a Royal Air Force (RAF) radar station. There were also 1 1/2 French infantry companies based at Fort Risban, to the west, with two field guns at the citadel and a number of other French troops manning the coastal defenses.































only Boulogne had come into regular use, while the main British supply lines still stretched back to ports west of the (BILL FARMER)Somme.
This all began to change after the start of the German campaign in the west. The German breakthrough at Sedan on 14-15 May split the Allied armies in half, and when Guderian’s Panzers reached the coast at Abbeville on 20 May, the B.E.F.’s supply lines were cut. Suddenly Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne became of critical importance. The true scale of the disaster had not yet been realised, and so when the first troops landed at Calais, their mission was to establish a new supply line to the BEF, which was still fighting around Lille and Arras, over fifty miles inland. Plans were also put in place to use the three ports to evacuate the B.E.F. if necessary.

Brigadier Claude
Nicholson

The defence of Calais would be carried out by Calais Force. This force contained one battalion each from the King’s Royal Rifle Corps (60th Rifles), the Queen Victoria Rifles and the Rifle Brigade, the 229th anti-tank battery of the Royal Artillery and a battalion from the Royal Tank Regiment, equipped with 21 light and 27 cruiser forces. This force would be supported by part of a Searchlight Regiment and part of an anti-aircraft regiment, all under the command of Brigadier Claude Nicholson.
800 French soldiers were also present in Calais, and would defend the citadel, a crucial part of the defences. This gave Nicholson a total of around 4,000 men.

Calais, 1940

After reaching the coast on 20 May, the Germans stopped for a day. When they began to move north on 22 May, the 10th Panzer Division was given the task of taking Calais, while the 1st Panzer Division was sent towards Dunkirk, with orders to make an attempt to capture Calais on the way past. At full strength each of these divisions contained somewhat over 15,000 men and at least 300 tanks, although on 23 May General Kleist, the commander of the armoured spearhead of the German attack would report that half of his tanks were out of action. Even so, the British and French at Calais would be outnumbered by at least three to one.
In 1940 the town of Calais was still contained within a line of bastions and ramparts. These had been modified after the Franco-Prussian War, but by 1940 this work was over sixty years old. Nicholson soon realised that he would be unable to hold this outer perimeter for long. He decided to make his main stand on an inner perimeter, which covered the northern part of Calais, including the old town, the docks and the citadel. This was a shorter line, and much of it was protected by water lines, in the canals that run through Calais and in the docks themselves.
22 May
The first elements of Calais Force, the Queen Victoria’s Rifles and the Tank Battalion, arrived in the port on 22 May and began to prepare for action. At this point the British were concentrating on preparing to link up with the forces at Dunkirk, and the creation of new supply lines for the B.E.F.
23 May
On the morning of 23 May the British in Calais still did not realise quite how close the Germans actually were. Elements of I Panzer Division had been ordered to make an attempt to capture Calais on their way towards Dunkirk, and by mid-morning columns of German tanks were approaching from the south west. Early in the morning patrols from the Queen Victoria’s Rifles were sent out to find the Germans, but they were perhaps rather too successful, for none returned.
Later in the morning three squadrons of tanks under Lt.-Colonel Keller left Calais, heading for St. Omer, twenty miles to the south east. At Guines, only five miles south of Calais, they ran into the German columns, advancing east from Marquise, and a short battle took place. Although the British tanks eventually retreated north to Coquelles, south west of Calais, this first German attack had been repulsed. I Panzer Division moved on, leaving X Panzer Division to deal with the defenders of Calais.































































The day also saw the troops from the King’s Royal Rifle Corps (60th Rifles) and the Rifle Brigade land on the dunes east of Calais, and Brigadier Nicholson reach Coquelles, to prepare to make the attempt to open communications with Dunkirk.
24 May
That attempt began at 2 a.m. on 24 May. It was made by one squadron of tanks and a company from the Rifle Brigade, but soon ran into strong German forces on the road to Dunkirk. Brigadier Nicholson, who was accompanying the attack, was soon forced to call it off. The British pulled back into Calais, and prepared to defend the outer perimeter.

 
The Citadel, Calais, 1940

According to German sources, on 24 May the 10th Panzer Division concentrated on sealing off Calais, and did not carry out a systematic attack until the next day. This is almost certainly not how the defenders of Calais saw things. Fighting broke out all around the outer perimeter. By 6 p.m. the Germans had broken through the outer perimeter, and Brigadier Nicholson was forced to move his headquarters from the Boulevard Léon Gambetta to the Gare Maritime, on the waterfront.
Artillery support for the defenders was provided by destroyers of the Royal Navy, along with the Polish warship Burza. These ships made a valuable contribution to the defence of Calais, but the coast was heavy – HMS Wessex was sunk, while HMS Vimiera and the Burza were both damaged. Later in the day HMS Wolfhound and HMS Verity made a trip into Calais, carrying supplies of ammunition, and Vice Admiral J. F. Somerville.
Somerville was able to meet with Nicholson, who gave him a summary of the British position. His men were short of ammunition. He only had two anti-tank guns and two light anti-aircraft guns left. On his return to Britain, Somerville would make a broadcast describing this meeting.
Early in the day the navy began to prepare to evacuate the troops at Calais, but this move did not meet with Churchill’s approval. By now he was coming to the conclusion that the force at Calais would have to fight on for as long as possible, to win time for the B.E.F. to reach Dunkirk, although the final decision would not be made until the following day.
25 May
X Panzer Division made a systematic attack on the inner perimeter during 25 May. By now the inner perimeter was made up of a series of separate posts, which could provide supporting fire, but were otherwise isolated. Despite this the Riflemen were able to hold of the German attacks for the entire day. In mid-afternoon Brigadier Nicholson moved his headquarters for one final time, this time to the citadel, where on the following day he would be captured.
At 9pm, after dinner, Churchill, Eden and Ironside finally decided not to evacuate the troops at Calais. Churchill recorded

feeling physically sick after making this decision, one of his first really hard decisions. The following signal was sent to Nicholson that night, although it is not certain that he ever received it.  

Every hour you continue to exist is of the greatest help to the B.E.F. Government has therefore decided you must continue to fight. Have greatest possible admiration for your splendid stand. Evacuation will not (

repeat not) take place, and craft required for above purposes are to return to Dover. Verity and Windsor to cover Commander Mine-sweeping and his retirement.

Despite this final decision, Admiral Ramsey decided to make a small fleet available in case the circumstances changed again. On the night of 25-26 May a flotilla of small ships made their way into the harbour, rescuing the wounded and the survivors of the Royal Marine detachment sent to protect the naval demolition crews.
26 May

 
The Courgain, Calais

The fighting at Calais lasted for most of 26 May. A German attack in the morning failed, although with low losses, but in the afternoon the defenders began to run short of ammunition. The Germans was able to bring their medium tanks into the battle, and by 4 pm had captured the harbour area. This was followed at 5 pm by a successful infantry assault on the citadel, which saw Brigadier Nicholson captured.
Even then the fighting did not end. British troops retreated into the Courgain, the fisherman’s quarter, and where they held on until 9 pm, when as darkness fell they were ordered to break up into small groups and make their own way out of the
town. By now there was little chance, and the majority fell into German hands.
The last British ship to visit Calais was the yacht Gulzar. She entered the harbour just after midnight, remaining until 1.00am on 27 May. She eventually picked up a part of 50 men from the end of the breakwater, and then made her way back to safety in Britain.
Conclusion
At the time the defence of Calais was seen as having been of vital importance. Calais was the last defended location before the Gravelines position, the western flank of the Dunkirk beachhead. According to this view, if Calais had not been held for as long as it was, then there would have been nothing to stop the Germans from sweeping into Dunkirk while the BEF was still engaged around Lille.
Since the war the importance of the defence of Calais has been constantly downplayed. Instead Hitler’s “halt order” of 24 May has been blamed for the German failure at Dunkirk. This forbade the German tanks from crossing a line running south from Gravelines, and remained in place for two days, before being lifted on 26 May. In the most extreme arguments, the defence of Calais has no significance at all. The post-war writing of the German generals is the main source used to support this viewpoint. This is always a dangerous line to follow – the German generals were generally unreliable witnesses, more concerned with the defence of their own records than with historical accuracy – Rundstedt’s denial of any part in the halt order is a classic example of this.
This argument does not stand up to closer examination. The first clashes at Calais took place on 23 May, the day before the halt order, and distracted I Panzer Division from the attack on Dunkirk. On 24 and 25 May, the two days of the halt order, Calais came under constant attack by the Luftwaffe, reducing the resources available to attack at Dunkirk.

British POWs, Calais

At the end of 25 May, when Churchill made the final decision not to evacuate Calais, his choice made perfect sense. Heavy fighting began at Calais on 24 May, the same day that the German tanks stopped. During 25 May the bulk of the BEF was still far from safety. The French position at Gravelines was increasing in strength, but the western flank of the corridor that the B.E.F. would have to use to reach Dunkirk was only defended by scattered units of the B.E.F. German troops had cross Hitler’s halt line at St Omer and Watten and were threatening the best road to Dunkirk. At least one German division was involved in the attack on Calais. If Churchill had pulled the British garrison out of Calais on the
night of 25-26 May then that division would have been available on 26 May when Hitler lifted the halt order. Finally, one should always remember that none of the Allied leaders knew about the halt order (something that some authors do seem to forget).
Ultimately it is impossible to be sure what might have happened on 26 May if the German troops that were engaged at Calais had been free to take part in the attack on the Dunkirk position, but what we do know is that without them the Germans failed to break through the lines being formed at Gravelines while they were at their weakest, a failure that allowed over 300,000 Allied troops to escape from the German trap

COULEUVRINIER

An imagined Maitre Jehan de Montesiler, the renowned couleuvriner at Orléans (1429), with a possible version of his weapon -- a hand-held 'culverin'. The configuration shown here, incorporates an early 'matchlock' (Z-shaped) triggering lever. The end that lowered to a touch-hole on the barrel of the gun held a lit-match or hot coal, that ignited the charge inside the gun. The length of the narrow gun stock required suggests that it was braced beneath the gunner's arm. A shorter, thicker stock might have been use, and would have rested against the side of the gunner's upper arm. The heavy gun barrel rested in the cut-out at the top of the large shield. Such shields had their own support, or could be held by an assistant to the gunner.

Many narratives of the famous siege of Orléans (1429) mention the actions of this gunner. Jean d'Aulon testified [some time after the event, at the rehabilitation trial of Jeanne d'Arc] that on the first day of attacking Les Augustins, he instructed the French gunner, Jehan de Lorraine, to take out "a large Englishman" who was causing great harm to the French attackers at the gate to the compound. The gunner succeeded in striking the particular English warrior just before the French rushed and seized Les Augustins. One author summarizes the activities on the gunner, Jehan, who was a "phenomenal shot with the culverin," as follows: "The English were already well acquainted with the gunner. From his post under the pier of a bridge he had inflicted almost as much damage upon them in his few days at Orleans as all of Gaucourt's garrison [defenders of the city] in the seven months of the siege. In spite of their attempts to retaliate, the fellow seemed to lead a charmed life. He obviously thought so too, for with a grim humor that was not without its risks he would pretend to be lying dead within full view of the enemy. Then when he thought they had rejoiced enough, he would cast gloom upon them by getting up and strutting insolently away, to repeat his deadly performance on his culverin." [Frances Winwar, The Saint and the Devil, Another account of the siege of Orléans (1429) is le Journal du siège d'Orléans [believed to have been maintained during the event and written by an observer inside of the city] mentions that on 3 March (1429), "Jean [Jehan] de Montesiler, originally from Lorraine, a very skilled couleuvriner ... killed in two shots 5 English, of whom [was] Richard, lord of Grey, nephew to Salisbury." Some authorities note that this "signaled the advent of this new arm." [André Corvisier, ed. Histoire militaire de la France p.188.] The killing of more than one individual with a single shot, suggests a sizable projectile -- possibly a stone ball, no larger than a human fist, but not a small lead shot. This, in turn, suggests a gun barrel of some caliber [diameter] -- slightly smaller than a modern infantry-carried mortar. Such a 'handgun' was probably too large [heavy] for a man to hold and aim without some assisted support for the gun. But certainly not so large that it could not be propped on a wall or large shield [pavise, used by crossbowmen]. Such a supported gun is an individual gun -- properly a 'hand-gun' or 'hand-cannon'. The next question is how well could the gun be used in a marksman's role -- which is the role ascribed to Jehan de Montesiler. Could Jehan have performed his feat without a matchlock? Was it possible to aim an individual's firearm that could not be raised to the gunner's eye level? Depending on how large the shot, the required accuracy of aiming may have differed -- smaller shot requiring more precision. The specific configuration of Maitre Jehan's gun remains an issue. Was it hand-held or hand-welded. It is questionable that the hand-held guns at the time were shoulder supported. Certainly, since the early fifteenth century there were handguns of very small barrel diameter and supported by the long wood shaft [stock] braced under the gunner's arm -- not an ideal position for marksman aiming. A slight advancement came about sometime in the early fifteenth century when the wood stock was shortened and braced aside the gunner's upper arm -- possibly even atop his shoulder. This certainly would improve the aligning of the eye to the gun barrel, and permit better aiming at a single target. What evidence is there that such a configuration existed in 1429 Western Europe? It should be noted that the marksman role was not the incentive for the early adoption of small firearms. The mass employment of the early handguns did not require marksman aiming to be effective. A large number of under-arm supported guns would contribute in disrupting an enemy's attack in the open, harassing crews operating siege artillery or workmen reparing damaged fortifications -- the traditional rolls for crossbow weapons. If the S- or Z- shaped lever for aligning the lit match to the powder hole were part of the guns, then there is a possibility of the gunner being able to point (aim) his peace with more precision. It should also be noted that a number of individually operated small guns would be more effective than the same number of tubes on a single multi-barreled gun in sustained encounters, as the former could be reloaded more quickly and directed more effectively toward targets. Of course, it required more gunners. With missile weapons, rate-of-fire is often more important than mass. What would cast considerable light on gunner Jehan's ability to have aimed his piece like a marksman is to know if his gun were configured with a matchlock. Burt Hall, and a few others who have examined the evidence of early medieval handguns, agree that one of the defining features of the first arquebus [to distinguish it from a short-barreled 16th-century musket that was also called an 'arquebus'] was the use of a mechanical device to align the match to the powder-hole. The first such mechanism was a Z-shaped lever that pivoted at a point along the side of the gunstock. As the rear end of the lever was squeezed to the stock, the front end lowered a hot coal or lit match to a touchhole and priming powder near the breech end of the gun barrel. The earliest evidence of such a device is an image in a 1411 manuscript now in the Österrichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna. The barrel of such guns rested on a wall, wagon side, a large shield, a pole support. Many of these hand-directed guns had projections ['hooks'] extending from beneath the stock of gun barrel. These 'hooked' on to the side of a wall, or wagon sideboard, and absorbed some of the recoil when the gun was fired. There are indications that primitative Z- and S- shaped mechanical locks were significantly introduced by 1430, and were used in the Hussite Wars (1419-1434) as well as by the gunner at Orléans in 1429. However, Burt Hall delays dating the effectiveness of these early 'arqubuses' until better [corned] gunpowder became available to propel the small shot at high velocities, which he suggests is about 1450. This tracts with the timeframe of recognized French artillery prowess. [B.S. Hall's Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore, 1997) pp. 96, 119-121, 147-151.]

Hand-gunner shown here with an arquebus, may have appeared in the very last battles of the Hundred Years' War. Modern authorities believe that the improved 'corned' gunpowder [ca. 1450] would have been necessary for such a small bore [about 15 mm] and longer barrel [about 1 meter] handgun to have been effective. Medieval illustrations that first depict such handguns date after 1470, and more around 1480, though their subject battle scenes may be of an earlier date.

On the other hand, there may not have been a requirement for the medieval handgunner, Jehan, to have had his eye aiming down the barrel to achieve his acclaimed marksmanship. After all, we do not know how many times he may have missed. His successful hits may have taken more than one shot, following some 'zeroing-in' shots to assess the trajectory, distance, and best angle of his gun barrel. There are examples of some well-practiced modern shooters who fire their small arm weapon 'from the hip', or with the barrel in some position lower than eye level, and achieve a degree of accuracy against a human-size target. Allowing for a gunner's experience and practice, and familiarity with the power of his particular gunpowder and individual gun, a trigger matchlock device may not have been essential. This 'experience and practice' could explain why the accounts do not mention others in this combat role.

crocketts life ended at the alamo

David Crockett, a legend in his time and since, was born in 1786 in East Tennessee. He knew first-hand the brutalities of frontier life. His grandparents were murdered by Creek and Cherokee Indians before he was born. By twelve years old he was bound out to a cattle drover from whom he had to escape through a snowstorm when the drover forcefully kept Davy past the end of his contract. Not having any luck with formal education, Crockett ran away from home at the age of thirteen in 1799. Between 1811 and 1813 Crockett fought under General Andrew Jackson in the Creek War. It was his reputation as an Indian fighter and frontiersman that first established his popularity. He used rough, exaggerated images of himself as soldier and hunter to rise to political positions. Although he was admired for being a strong, hard and heroic frontiersman, the obsessive admiration of Davy Crockett was due in large part to his humor. He was charismatic and possessed the mastery of vernacular coupled with common sense that made him a natural storyteller with the power to enthrall his audience and parody his opponents. He served two terms in the Tennessee legislature and was elected to Congress three times. After years as a Democratic Jacksonian, Crockett broke ties with Jackson in 1828 and became a Whig for the remainder of his political career.
A Narrative of the Life of David Crockett (1834) is the autobiography most likely to be the actual work of Crockett; edited by Thomas Chilton. Much of the other writing attributed to Crockett was actually penned by ghost writers (presumably due to Crockett's lack of formal education) and was approved by Crockett before publication. "Bear Hunting in Tennessee" is a story fromA Narrative of the Life of David Crockett that emphasized Crockett's reputation as a great bear hunter-- one of the first mighty hunters in Southwestern humor. Unlike Thorpe's later creation of the mighty hunter, Jim Doggett, Crockett's role is used to further the myth that allowed Crockett to become a legend of the old West within his lifetime and for years to come.It was written by an author who falsely attributed the "autobiography" to Crockett (ostensibly to boost sales), Davy's endearing reputation as a teller of tall tales was secured. Crockett eventually did write his autobiography, which also spun some unbelievable yarns. In one chapter,he says he killed over a hundred bears in opne year.
But politically he lost ground.Crockett changed his views toward American Indians. As a Congressman for Tennessee, he came to oppose President Andrew Jackson's land-use policies. The president's ideas for securing new settlements included the forced removal of American Indians from their tribal lands. Crockett was so vehemently opposed to American Indian removal and land grabbing that he lost the election for his third term in Congress in 1831.
 A bit irked that he'd lost his Congressional seat, he left Tennessee, but not before raising a toast to his friends: "You may all go to hell and I will go to Texas," he told them [source: Texas State Library]. He was so caught up in the Texas revolutionary spirit as the former Mexican state struggled for independence (and intrigued by the promise of money from land speculation that a free republic eventually promised), that he volunteered to serve as a member of the rebel militia fighting the Mexican Army there.
Crockett died in Texas the next year during the famous 1836 siege at the Alamo, but his death only brought him more glory. He's been portrayed in depictions of the battle using his trusty musket "Old Betsy" as a club, dealing blows to Mexican soldiers. His soldiering was called into question later from firsthand accounts that told of Crockett being captured rather than dying amid a rubble of Mexican corpses. But when the diary of a Mexican solider who had fought at the Alamo was discovered in 1975, Crockett's valiant reputation was supported by the soldier's words: Crockett had been a rallying figure for the doomed men at the fort before he was brutally executed at the hands of the Mexicans upon his capture. Anopther report said he disguised himself as a woman and hid in a barrel, (A clash of two Eagles book)
At the Alamo, the bulk of General Santa Anna's army consisted of eight (8) Infantry Battalions divided into five (5) Columns and consisted of some 1,800 men. On paper, each Battalion consisted of eight (8) companies  of 80 men each, but desertions and deaths on the march reduced unit strengths considerably. On paper, and not followed at the Alamo, each Battalion was broken down as follows:

Fusileros: There were six (6) companies of Fusileros or Line Infantrymen. They were armed with .75 caliber East India Pattern "Brown Bess" Rifles. The tail-coat shown above is the Model 1832 pattern. Fusileros also wore medium blue trousers with a red stripe. Footwear consisted of "brogans" (shoes) or sandals 

Cazadores: There was one (1) company of sharpshooters and they were the finest marksmen in the Battalion. They were supposed to be armed with the .61 caliber Baker rifles, however, in most cases they were armed as were the Fusileros. The tailcoat shown above is the Model 1833, which is piped in green to indicate the wearer as being in the Cazadore Compania, They also wore "brogans" (shoes) or sandals and, for the most part, wore plain gray trousers.     

Granaderos: There was one (1) company of Granaderos or Grenadiers, which consisted of the older veterans who served as the Battalion's reserve force. They were armed with .75 caliber East India Pattern "Brown Bess" Rifles and their tailcoat, shown above, is also the Model 1833. They also wore "brogans" (shoes) or sandals and, by regulation, medium blue trousers with a red stripe. 

Zapadores: These were General Santa Anna's elite Sappers, that were held in reserve and then finally ordered into the assault to "bolster" the reluctant troops during the final assault on the North Wall. Only some 180 of these troops were at the siege and no doubt "encouraged" the soldadoes forward with a little "prodding" at the point of a bayonet. Recent information indicates that some of the Zapadores wore "barracks" caps, and white leather aprons, in lieu of the standard attire, and carried axes in order to chop through the adobe walls, at the northwest corner of Alamo, and in order to gain entry. Back of Tunic: Rear view of the tail-coat and barracks cap, the latter which was commonly worn by Zapadores (elite Mexican Sappers) during trenching operations and the final Alamo assault.  

Many of the companies, that assaulted the Alamo, wore summer weight white linen or cotton "fatigue" trousers, in lieu of those mentioned above, despite the bitterly freezing cold weather that plagued the Mexican Army on their over 300 mile forced march to San Antonio de Bexar. Additionally, during the early morning assault on the final day that commenced at 0500 hours (5 AM) in the morning, many of the troops wore sandals and all were ordered to discard their packs, blankets and overcoats.      

It should be noted that, for the most part, the Mexican Army, that made the long march to Texas and dutifully engaged the defenders at the Alamo, were not the untrained gaggle of simple minded peasants that Hollywood had portrayed them until recently. Neither were they more sadistic, more savage or more blood-thirsty then their Texas foe, as the latter so clearly proved at the battle of San Jacinto a couple of months after the Alamo siege. We can, and probably will, debate forever who was wrong and who was right during the Texas War of Independence. But through all of the arguments only one thing must remain perfectly clear if nothing else does. The Mexican Army was, arguably and undeniably, a professional army in their own right. They fought bravely and were committed to their "cause" no less heroically and with no less passion than the Texian defenders who opposed them from within the battered walls of the Alamo.The standard issue musket carried by the Mexican soldiers at the Alamo was the 3rd Model (East India Pattern) British  "Brown Bess"  smoothbore musket (above). Considered "surplus" by the British, these weapons were the primary weapon issued in Santa Anna's army and were of a 75-caliber with a length of 54 inches and a weight of about 9 pounds. The weapon also had a 15" long, socket bayonet that was secured to the weapon by the front sight blade. In the hands of an untrained soldier, it was difficult to hit a target passed about 50 yards and had a 40% misfire rate due to poor powder. These limitations, however, did not concern General Santa Anna, sinceaccuracy stood second to the deadly bayonet charge. The lack of marksmanship training, poor quality powder and the limited visibility in the pre-dawn darkness of 6 March 1836 may all have contributed to the weapons less than satisfactory performance during that chilly predawn assault.  The Mexican Cazadores (Sharpshooters) are believed to have carried the Model 1806 British Baker Rifled Musket. It had a 30.5" barrel with a rifled .615  caliber bore consisting of seven square cut grooves which completed a mere quarter turn along the length of the barrel. A 22.5 inch short sword, which hooked on to the side of the barrel, served as a bayonet. It was in production from 1800 to 1838. Accurate to about 175 yards, it could be loaded while prone and  was also sufficiently robust to take a bayonet and withstand the rigors of hand-to-hand combat during a lengthy period of service. Excavations, conducted south of the compound wall in February 1985 by  archeologists from the University of Texas at San Antonio, revealed that Baker Rifle were used by some of the Mexican soldiers at the Alamo. 

As for the Alamo defenders (Texians), which consisted of some 189 Anglo and Mexican patriots (yes there were Mexicans who fought with the Texians), they were armed with a variety of weapons ranging from shotguns to flintlock pistols to tomahawks Pennsylvania .50 caliber rifled muskets. Most common, especially in the hands of the New Orleans Grays, was the Model 1803 and Model 1816 US Flintlock Rifles, one of which is pictured above. Both were made by  Harpers Ferry Armory. Then Model 1803 had a 35½" browned octagon to round .54 caliber barrel, a flat blade brass front sight and an open blued steel rear sight. The weapon also had a steel ramrod with brass end and a walnut half stock with a case-hardened lock plate. The Model 1816 US Flintlock Musket had a 42" round .69 caliber smoothbore barrel without a front or rear sight. It had a steel ramrod with button shaped head and a bayonet lug on top of barrel at muzzle. It was a three banded weapon with iron mountings, 57" stock to barrel tip and weight of ¾ lbs. 

The typical Pennsylvania/Kentucky Rifle was .50 caliber, made of curly maple full stock and sported a 42 to 46 inch barrel. A crescent-shaped buttplate, patchbox and cheek piece were also common to this weapon. It is believed that David Crockett and the 14 members of the Tennessee Mounted Volunteers used these rifles as they manned their position in the southern palisade of the Alamo. In the capable hands of an expert, the Pennsylvania long rifle could hit a target at a range of out to 250 yards. As for flintlock pistols, many of the Alamo defenders carried at least two, however, their maximum effective range of 30 yards made them impractical except at close quarters.  Much lore circles about as to the "pounding" rendered upon the Alamo by the Mexican artillery prior to the morning of the final assault. In truth, on the morning of the final assault Santa Anna ordered that no cannons fire out of feat of awaking the sleeping defenders. Prior to that, Santa Anna only had light cannons, his heavier pieces not arriving until the day after the battle. During the entire 12 days before the assault, he had but 6 small caliber field guns (6-pounders) and two howitzers to batter down the Alamo walls, none of which were effective and no casualties were inflicted on the defenders. Outside of lobbing "grenades" into the compound plaza, the main purpose served by Santa Anna's "artillery" was to wear the defenders down via almost constant harassing fire.  If the artillery can lay claim to inflicting mass casualties than it was the defender's cannons that laid waste to whole lines of men rather then those of the Mexican. Army. Of the assaulting force, some believe that the casualties could have been as high as 600 killed and wounded. There can be little doubt that given the darkness, the limited number of defenders (about 189) and the swiftness of the assault (the Mexicans crept silently to with about 100 yards from the Alamo walls undetected), the weapon most responsible for "cutting down whole companies" of Mexican soldiers had to be the defender's cannons firing grapeshot at point blank range. Sleepy, stressed out Texians firing muskets in the darkness may have accounted for a comparatively few casualties. Even if a good number of Mexican soldiers were shot by their own excited comrades, in the heat of the assault, this simply could not come close to explaining the losses sustained in so short a brief assault (about 90 minutes from start to finish).  Within the Alamo walls there is believed to have been 21 cannons of various sizes, although Colonel James McNeal reported that there were 24 cannons in the mission. The majority of the cannons used by the defenders were captured in December 1835 when Mexican General Perfecto Co's surrendered the Alamo to the mission to Texians prior to his departure from San Antonio de Bexar. They consisted of  the famous 18 pounder, 1 x iron 16-pounder, 1 x iron 12-pound gunnade,  1 x 9"pedrero (fired stone balls) , 2 x iron 8-pound guns, 6 x 6-pounders, 3 x iron 4-pounders, 4 x bronze 4-pound cannons and 2 x 2-pounders. The other three cannons were not used and were lying in the courtyard. There is little doubt that in the first few minutes of the assault the cannons reeked pure havoc on the attacking Mexican soldiers. However, after the initial volleys were fired the Mexicans were at the foot of the outside walls and the barrels of the cannons could not be depressed enough to fire at their targets. Additionally, the Texans were so busy trying to the Mexican soldiers from climbing the walls that they did not have time to reload their cannons and the firepower advantage of the defenders cannons was over within the first few moments of the attack.